How Indian Air Force Managed to Fool its Enemy with This Clever Tactic
After the 1971 Indo-Pak War finished, it was acknowledged that Indian Air Force had an enduring predominance over its partner Pakistani Air Force who lost considerably aircraft than Indian Air Force during the combat. After the war finished, John Fricker, authorized by Pakistan Air Force out of the blue asserted that Indian Air Force had really obtained a Tu-126 AWACS Aircraft from its customary ally Soviet Union which it used to control Night-time Strikes upon PAF Bases.
Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system can be termed as any Air Force’s ‘Eye in the Sky’ as it can carry out long-range surveillance in all-weather conditions and also perform command and control. Tu-126 entered service in 1965 and only 12 were ever built and it is a popular perception that India leased at least one Tu-126 during 1971 Indo-Pak war taking into account the effectiveness of IAF Fighters during Night Time and the coordination achieved by IAF which dumbstruck PAF.
Anyway, the truth was a long way from what saw. Amid the 1971 Indo-Pak War, another unit was raised at Ambala to direct provocation strikes against PAF amid Night. They were named CADU and were furnished with Mig-21 and Su-7 yet the issue was that they were not fit for Night Time Operations. Their route gear just comprised of a KCI Gyro Compass and Stop Watch as the Moving Thumb Indicator and Radio was of little utilize.
With no navigational guide and absence of flying in the evening time, the first class pilots of CADU discovered it very extreme to adapt to such circumstances. Add to it the low fuel limit of the warriors they used to fly and the conceivably lower battle span which constrained the pilots to assess at dearest cordial spaces in the evening time.
These pilots flew at a low level which in military terms is known as “Ground Napping” which was used to dodge radars and military block attempts. In any case, this likewise implied even the agreeable radars were not able to recognize these airships and were not ready to signal the airplanes to neighbourly landing strips. This expanded the danger of peril for pilots on the off chance that they are not ready to identify the landing strip in all-out dull. This prompted two or three misfortunes as the pilot were not ready to distinguish the landing strip in obscurity and this prompted the introduction of the “SPARROW”.
Indian Air Force chose to put a Mig-21 Type 77 Aircraft at an elevation of 9000 meters-10,000 meters which could hand-off homing and other essential data to the strike flying machine returning after the mission. PAF Strike Aircrafts were a danger accordingly as an aircraft set at such a high height were potential easy pickings for Mirages and Starfighters of PAF. Anyway, the Type 77 SPARROWS would be all around put inside Indian Airspace under inviting spread to anchor them from PAF.
Amid the 1971 War, SPARROW directed exactly 30 missions from Adampur transferring hit aeroplanes with code words to trick and confound the adversary if these transfers are captured by PAF. These codes were utilized to pass on Homing and Diversion Parameters and Proximal Airbases to strike flying machines and messages could likewise be handed-off to Indian Radar stations accordingly making these SPARROW’s control a gigantic volume of airspace with coordinated activities and battlespace administration.
This was a powerful military strategy utilized by Indian Air Force to hand-off its strike warriors in Low-Level Strike Missions and furthermore to sign them back securely to their command post while befuddling the adversary that IAF had really acquired a Tu-126 AWACS to control its flying machines. It was the most straightforward thought and powerful strategy used by the Indian Air Force to meet its closures.